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Contact Us:
Dan Emerson
Greg Guevara
Paul Mannweiler
Andrew McNeil
Stephanie Penninger
Sandra Perry
Phil Ripani
Karen
Glasser Sharp
Dave Swider
©
2007
Bose McKinney & Evans LLP
Indianapolis
2700 First Indiana Plaza
135 North Pennsylvania Street
Indianapolis, IN 46204
(317) 684-5000
Fax (317) 684-5173 and
Meridian Corporate Plaza Two
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Parkway
Suite 300
Indianapolis, IN 46280
(317) 684-5300
Fax (317) 684-5316
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Chesterton, IN 46304
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Fax (219) 983-1741 Crown
Point
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Fax (219) 663-3969
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(765) 464-3200
Fax (765) 464-3225
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North Carolina
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(202) 973-1229
Fax (202) 973-1212
www.boselaw.com
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It is Risky Business for
Employers to Use Off-the-Shelf Severance and Release Agreements
The widespread use of severance
agreements and general releases in the departing-employee context has
relaxed many employers into simply modifying the last release agreement
their lawyer prepared for them and utilizing it again without seeking
lawyer review. Constant changes in the law surrounding waivers and
releases make that a risky proposition. Indeed, a recent Fourth Circuit
case underscores this point by questioning the validity of any release
that contains a waiver of rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act1
(“FMLA”) without prior court or Department of Labor (“DOL”) approval.
In Taylor v. Progressive Energy, Inc.2, (“Taylor II”),
the court held that without prior court or DOL approval, 29 C.F.R §
825.220(d) bars the prospective and retrospective waiver or release of
employees’ FMLA rights, including the right to bring a claim for a
violation of the FMLA. The court’s decision reinstates its decision in
Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc.3, in which Barbara
Taylor asserted that Progressive Energy, Inc. (“Progressive”), her
employer’s parent company, had violated the FMLA with respect to her
termination. Unsuccessfully, Progressive argued that Taylor had released
her right to assert FMLA claims against it when she entered into a
general release and severance agreement containing a catch-all release
of claims (which did not specifically mention the FMLA).
In reaffirming its prior decision, the Taylor II court reasoned
that allowing employees to prospectively waive their proscriptive and
remedial FMLA rights would undermine the purpose of the Act, as well as
section 220(d), and lead to circumstances in which it is less expensive
for employees to settle claims than to comply with the FMLA. As well, at
the time section 220(d) was promulgated, the DOL had clearly indicated
that waivers should not be allowed in connection with the post-dispute
settlement of FMLA claims. It was only after the court vacated its
earlier decision that the DOL intervened in Taylor II and argued,
in its amicus brief, that public policy disfavors prospective waivers of
rights yet encourages the settlement of claims. Nevertheless, the court
found that public policy should be excepted when it would thwart the
legislative policy it was designed to effectuate. Moreover, when the
court analogized the FMLA to the FLSA it found that both acts set forth
minimum floors of protection for employees, and any separation agreement
or release providing employees with less than the statutory minimum
would frustrate Congressional purpose.
Although it is unclear how the U.S. Supreme Court or Seventh Circuit
(which includes Indiana) would rule on this issue, other courts have
concluded that the invalid waiver of certain rights, like the FMLA, may
serve to nullify the entire release agreement. Hence, employers should
avoid catch-all waivers in separation and release agreements and,
instead, tailor the terms of the release to a particular dispute or
claims an employee is likely to assert against the employer. Most
importantly, the lesson is that employers would be well-served to
consult with their employment law counsel for preparation or review of
each severance agreement the employer contemplates or risk the
consequences of making severance payments to former employees who will
use the money to engage counsel to sue the employer in the face of an
invalid release of claims.
For more information, please contact
Dave Swider, (317) 684-5161,
dswider@boselaw.com or Stephanie Penninger, (317) 684-5209,
spenninger@boselaw.com.
_______________________________________
129 U.S.C. §2601 et. seq.
2No. 04-1525, 2007 WL 1893362 (4th Cir., July 3, 2007).
3415 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 2005). |